Ghana's Policy on the Ivorian Crisis (Part Four)

GHANA’S POLICY ON THE IVORIAN CRISIS ( PART FOUR) PROTECTING GBAGBO WITH THE LANGUAGE OF DIPLOMACY


A SYNOPTIC PURVIEW

By Samuel Adjei Sarfo

The overall objective of this series of articles was to give a cogent background to the Ivorian political crisis, to examine the validity of the arguments of the Gbagbo faction for nullifying the election results as announced by the Independent Electoral Commission of Ivory Coast, to evaluate the wisdom of the Ghana government’s policy on the Ivorian crisis, to examine the popular views and fears expressed by the general population, and to advance options available for a resolution of the Ivorian Impasse.
The first part of this article gave a comprehensive background to the Ivorian crisis, noting that the seed of division planted by Conan Bedie when he sought to disqualify Alassane Ouattara from contesting the presidency flourished into the coup by General Guei. Conan Bedie succeeded Houphouet Boigny as President in 1998. In the year 2000, during the presidential elections , much against international opinion and national wisdom, Conan Bedie provided the catalyst for the Ivorian conflict through a law quickly drafted by his government and approved in a referendum which required both parents of a presidential candidate to be born within Côte d'Ivoire. This excluded the northern presidential candidate Alassane Ouattara from the race. Ouattara represented the predominantly Muslim north, particularly the poor immigrant workers from Mali and Burkina Faso working on coffee and cocoa plantations.

In the face of all this, the military intervened throu
gh a coup detat in Ivory Coast and General Guei took over as Head of State . He was in power for some time, after which he organized presidential elections. Surprisingly, the laws on the books remained unchanged and Alassane Ouatatra remained disqualified. His party boycotted the elections and only Laurent Gbagbo contested the elections with Guei. The results of the electoral commission showed a clear 56% win for Gbagbo and 36% for Guei, yet General Guei had the results overturned, declaring himself President. Laurent Gbagbo then unleashed the people’s power unto the streets, and hundreds of people died during that demonstration. Unable to sustain the heat, General Guei fled to France, and Gbagbo declared himself President.
But the main political actors called for fresh elections, arguing that Gbagbo’s election did not reflect the popular will, insofar as it was not procured through a level ground wherein all eligible candidates could contest. The opposition’s demand fell on deaf ears, and their demonstrations against Gbagbo were met with brute force. The result of the frustration was the rebellion that began in 2002. Rebel army sympathetic to Ouattara moved all the way from the north to Abidjan, and they were poised to take the presidential palace when the French army interposed itself between the rebels and the presidential palace. The country was divided between the north, held by the rebel forces, and the south, held by Gbagbo’s government.


Negotiation by the international community began and ended in a United Nations Security Council Resolution which established UNOCI. The Council authorized UNOCI to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment.

This detailed mandate virtually made the United Nations a partner and a huge investor in the Ivorian political context, endowing it as an impartial referee in the socio-economic fortunes of the Ivorian process from beginning to the end. The UN was to provide logistics for elections and to support social integration and equilibrium within the Ivorian society. The parties to the conflict duly signed on to this project, and bound themselves to the outcomes as certified by the UN and other international actors. Thus the United Nations had a vested interest in Ivory Coast to the point where no one signatory to the Ouagadougou accord can decide to expel the world body.


In Part Two of this article, the author narrated details of the elections in Ivory Coast, noting that Gbagbo accepted the results of the first round without protest. Gbagbo went into the second round with his Cyclopean eye open, having submitted to the mandates of the Independent Electoral Commission and the supervision of the international community.

Part Two of this article also explained that the calls for a so-called diplomatic solution to the crisis have been strident and that given the secret meeting of President Atta Mills and F.P. Rawlings, one can assume that the government policy against forced removal of Gbagbo is informed by Rawlings’ articulated objections to the use of force. Yet these calls are short on exactly what outcome the government of Ghana contemplates when it calls for diplomatic or dialogical solution. One can only imagine that the calls are color-coded in favor of power- sharing. Of this kind of arrangement, Kenya and Zimbabwe point the way to its insufficiency and danger. That kind of arrangement sets up a paradigm for the demise of democracy in Africa.

We may also assume that by the loud calls for diplomatic /dialogical solution, the government of Ghana is presupposing that Gbagbo must be persuaded to step down. But up to this point, it takes a stream of faith to imagine that this miracle will happen. Gbagbo is not going to budge by any persuasion. The man is digging in by the day and no amount of words can convince him to give up power.
Furthermore, if the Mills government were objective and sincere, one will imagine that when it calls on the international community to exercise restraint and opt for a peaceful resolution, their calls will be coupled with some affirmative action to urge Gbagbo to step down; or at the very least, incorporate by reference the international community’s concerns and demands. And yet herein lies the hypocrisy of these calls, that those calling for a peaceful resolution go ahead to discredit the elections, to raise issues of tribal tensions which should trump the electoral results, to demand another elections, or to simply cast doubt about the nationality of Ouattara and the people of the north of Ivory Coast.

As the case now stands, we have people who are shouting about restraint and resolution who are at the same time telegraphing their preference for a Gbagbo presidency. Their intent has nothing to do with peace and diplomacy, but to protect a Gbagbo presidency by disguising their preference in the language of peace and diplomacy

The Ghana government’s policy is also founded on the language of fear that paints a doomsday scenario should any force be used against Gbagbo. The government parrots the insinuations of the Gbagbo faction about the safety of the nationals and interests we have in Ivory Coast. In other words, government impliedly supports Gbagbo’s attempt to use our nationals and interests as chips to sow fear and paint nightmare scenarios, forgetting that these scenarios will be no different if Gbagbo continues to defy the international community and to remain in power. One such outcome will be a civil war in Cote d’Ivoire. In the case of a civil war, refugees are going to stream across the border anyway and Ghanaian nationals residing in Ivory Coast, and the oil interest of Ghana along the Ivorian border are going to suffer the same fate as that which the government of Ghana fears will result should force be used to oust Gbagbo. Even with a Gbagbo presidency and a civil war in Ivory coast, the enumerated problems are going to be worse because a civil war will be more prolonged than an interventionist force.

Ghana’s policy of détente about the Ivorian crisis is indeed misplaced because the resistance against the use of force is not informed by any good faith, but capsuled in diplomatic language to preserve a Gbagbo presidency. The strident calls for peace are not accompanied by an equally persuasive action to persuade Gbagbo to cede power. Rather, it is tainted by articulate pronouncements that undercut the integrity of the election and question its validity in the face of ethnic tensions in Ivory Coast. Finally, the nightmare scenarios painted as an excuse not to intervene by force are invalid, insofar as these dangers will persist under a Gbagbo presidency.
The third part of this article answered some of the arguments posed by the Gbagbo faction, namely that the Constitutional Council had the power to declare Gbagbo winner of the elections. This author argued that Independent Electoral Commission had the mandate to conduct the elections and to declare the results within a certain timeframe and since it was prevented from the Gbagbo faction from formally declaring the results, the law does not contemplate the absurd consequences that the Constitutional Council can declare any trumped-up results. Estoppel requirements also lead to the same logical conclusion that the results are still valid as announced by the Independent Electoral Commission. Before the eyes of the whole world, the results sheets were ripped by a Gbagbo supporter when the commission attempted to announce it within the timeframe. By this very act, it follows that the Gbagbo faction cannot benefit from a delay that arose from the obstructions and obstacles posed by their very acts.

The Council is not supposed to re-analyze or invent new results; it is simply to formally ratify the results as submitted by the Independent Electoral Commission. Beyond this interpretive scope of the Council’s power, the law leads to an absurd consequence, since the power of the court will trump the will of the people. This will be in contradiction of the principle that true sovereignty lies in no court, but in the mass of the people. Here, the court struck down half a million votes! What evidentiary or procedural standard supported this arbitrary and disparate and desperate action? And wherein lies the power of the court to do this? Assuming that the court had such untrammeled power, how did it proceed to exercise it? How many witnesses were called? How many arguments were made? What universal due process standards were used in coming to a conclusion that affects the adult suffrage of the people of the Ivory Coast?

Even if all these questions were elegantly answered, the court’s decision will still be wrong if it offends public policy and the fundamental principles of justice and fairness known in civilized societies. And it does, given that the whole issue can be syllogistically summarized thus: a people went to the polls to elect a president under the aegis and mandate of the international community. The results were declared by a body mandated to do so and certified under the aegis and mandate of the international community. Therefore the loser must accept the results as declared by the mandated authority under the aegis and mandate of the international community.

The author further argued that any reliance on the Bush v. Gore decision is misplaced. This is because the Bush v. Gore decision, in spite of its adherence to all the proper procedures of American jurisprudence, is too controversial and discredited, signaling the lowest point in American jurisprudence. The opinion itself impugns its precedential value by stating, “the per curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case”. Moreover, if upon impartial analysis, a decision is found to be inherently flawed, it must not serve as stare decisis in developing countries simply because it emanates from the pantheon of an American Supreme Court.

In conclusion, the author posited that Laurent Gbagbo, who cut his milk teeth in politics by personifying the ideals of democracy, has a unique obligation to exemplify its model and blaze its trail. Again, the man who suffered the pain of having his victory annulled must be circumspect in dishing out the same fortune to another victor. The lessons inherent in the Bush v. Gore decision for Gbagbo ought rather be in the character of Al Gore who accepted defeat honorably although he was then the Vice President. Or in the Equal Protection guarantees inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution that individual ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate treatment". Or that time {for announcement of election results} is inconsequential and of no essence when it comes to preserving the constitutional rights of a people

Samuel Adjei Sarfo lives in Houston, Texas. You can email him at [email protected]