Lies, big lies, benevolent deception, and the ethics of telling lies

Referring to recent happenings - globally and locally (at the University of Ghana) Professor Chris Gordon of the University of Ghana quizzed whether or not there was no scope for Social Sciences and Medical Sciences researchers (Psychiatry, Pharmacology) of the University of Ghana to do some studies on the mindsets of the local “Vandals” and compare with international “Vandals”.

“I think it was Joseph Goebbels who stated that "If you tell a lie big enough and keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it". How do we here in Ghana handle the "Big Lie"? Is the response to big lies based on reason? Does loyalty over ride fact? If statements made by leaders incite others to violence, are the leaders culpable? What is the role of social media in spreading the big lie? These are some of the research questions people with appropriate experience may wish to consider, perhaps even as student projects”- notes Professor Gordon.

Professor Amos Laar’s response is reproduced below.

Professor Gordon touches on a very important, but complicated topic here. Hopefully as a learned community we are appropriately placed to handle it. Prof, permit me to add to your non-exhaustive list, an important constituency - bioethicists and philosophers. Those of us with training or interest in these areas have struggled for years to appreciate the subject. The subject of lying. A couple of years ago, I had the opportunity to receive tutelage on a related top – “the Ethics of Lying”. I felt I had found the answer to the question. "I had lied to myself". It never happened. I got more confused in the end.

My teachers attempted to address such questions as:
“Is "lying" ever morally permissible? When is it right to tell a “white Lies? ...to engage in self-deception?, benevolent deception? etc.. My teachers nearly succeeded in convincing me that “the Society, our society itself is a lie”. They would cite examples relating to "clothing, makeup, plastic surgeries, ceremonial niceties, certain aspects of our culture ... as " an art of masking". Lately, I have just noticed that the art of communication itself is “a lie”. The "mature" never says everything sans mascara and styling gel. To notice that now, may be a sign that I am late in the game. And so before we condemn “the art of lying”, we should think again.

But yes, Professor Gordon qualifies “his lie” as “big lie”. If I am permitted, I would extend this by saying that, all lies are lies, but some are more lies than others. The issue, however is, are we in a position to address the question which lie – in our context (and not relying on Euro-American standards, definitions or yardstick, as Professor Gordon hinted), qualifies as a big lie? This might be added to the list of research questions suggested by Professor Gordon.

My teachers introduced me to this entry on the Definition of Lying and Deception at the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (details here https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/lying-definition/

For the convenience of readers, I have extracted some (not all) of the different definitions of lies.

Let’s begin with the traditional definition of lying (L1).

(L1) “To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person with the intention that the other person believe that statement to be true.”
If one makes a truthful statement, intending one’s addressee to believe that the statement is false, then one is not lying".
There are more than two-dozen objections to L1. Have a look at 7 of such objections.

(L2) “To lie =df to make a statement that p, where p is believed to be false, to another person, with the intention that the other person believe that p is believed to be true. (cf. Williams 2002, 74, 96–97)”

(L3) “To lie =df to make a believed-false statement (to another person), either with the intention that that statement be believed to be true (by the other person), or with the intention that it be believed (by the other person) that that statement is believed to be true (by the person making the statement), or with both intentions. (Mahon 2008, 227–228)”

(L4) “To lie =df to make a believed-false statement, to another person or in the believed hearing of another person, with the intention that some other person—the person addressed or the other person in the believed hearing—believe some believed-false statement to be true. (Newey 1997, 100)”

(L5)“x lies to y if and only if (i) x states that p to y, (ii) x believes that p is false and (iii) x intends to be deceptive to y in stating that p. (Lackey 2013, 237)”

(L6) “To lie =df to (i) make a believed-false or believed-not-true statement to another person; (ii) believe that the conditions are such that the other person is justified in believing that the statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement; (iii) believe that the conditions are such that the other person is justified in believing that the person making the statement intends to contribute causally to the other person believing that the statement is believed to be true by the person making the statement. (Chisholm and Feehan 1977; cf. Guenin 2005)”

I thought this was an interesting illustration
According to L6 it not possible to lie if the speaker believes that the conditions are such that the hearer is not justified in believing that the speaker is making a truthful statement. Kant provides an example in which a thief grabs a victim by the throat and asks him where he keeps his money. If the victim were to make the untruthful statement, “I have no money,” Kant says that this is not a lie, “for the other knows that… he also has no right whatever to demand the truth from me” (Kant 1997, 203; but see Mahon 2009).

Chisholm and Feehan hold that the victim is not making an assertion, and hence, is not lying, given that the victim believes that the thief is not justified in believing that the victim is being truthful (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 154–155; but see Strudler 2009 (cf. Strudler 2005; 2010), for the argument that the thief can believe that the victim is credible, even if not trustworthy, because he is motivated by the threat of violence).

Let me spare you L 7 – L9

It even gets more complicated when we move into the realm of “Moral Deceptionism”

(L10) “To lie =df to make a believed-false statement to another person, with the intention that that other person believe that statement to be true (or believe that the statement is believed to be true, or both), violating that person’s right to exercise liberty of judgment. (Grotius 2005)”

Yet another illustration:

According to L10, one cannot lie to “Children or Madmen,” for example, since they lack the right of liberty of judgment (Grotius 2005, 1212). One cannot lie to someone who has given “express Consent” to be told untruths, since he has given up the right to exercise his liberty of judgment about these matters (Grotius 2005, 1214).

One cannot lie to someone who by “tacit Consent” or presumed consent “founded upon just Reason” has given up the right to exercise his liberty of judgment about some matter, “on account of the Advantage, that he shall get by it,” such as when “a Person… comforts his sick Friend, by making him believe what is false,” since “no Wrong is done to him that is willing” (Grotius 2005, 1215–1217).

Have a look at L17.

(L17) “x lies to y if and only if … x says that p to y, and … x proposes that p becomes common ground, and … x believes that p is false. (Stoke 2013a, 49)”

In all these, may TRUTH STAND!!! Professor Laar concludes his response.